In the past three weeks there have been two incidents in the Macdonald tunnel involving
RTE’S sustaining inhalation injuries. In the first incident the conductor on train 805-012
inhaled fumes when he was required to inspect his train as a result of successive UDE’S
while operating through the tunnel. The conductor reported subsequently that the ventilation
system was apparently functioning as intended. He first walked westward fifteen carlengths
To bay twelve to obtain a gas mask.He then proceeded eastward to inspect his train. In the
IRR conducted after the incident the conductor stated he felt the contributing factors included
Diesel fumes from three locomotives, the fact that he had a very poor fit on his gas mask and
he also had to take the mask off to communicate on the radio with the engineman.The
conductor stated further that he had never received instruction in the proper fit procedures for
the gas masks. There are several questions that come to mind in regard to this specific
incident .The first is “Why was this RTE never trained in the proper method of fitting the gas
mask ,and likewise how many other employees still haven’t received this training?”. Secondly
in the “ Occupational Hygiene Survey – Diesel Exhaust Mt. Macdonald Tunnel Simulated
Emergency Work” dated 00/04/02 “it states in recommendation number two” Written work
procedures are r`equired for train crews in case of emergency in the tunnels . It states further
that “This is especially important as work procedures can reduce exhaust levels in the tunnels
to accommodate the limitations of the respiratory protection provided .”The question is
“Are these administrative controls in the form of written work procedures clearly stated so as
to leave no doubts in the minds of rte’s involved in potentially hazardous situations ?”Thirdly
in correspondence between former S.A.M. Chris Carroll and Chris Kane-Occupational
Hygiene Specialist in a communication dated 00/06/01 Kane states “The protection afforded
you [by the mask] would be greatly reduced given you had to remove the mask to use the
radio.” This is another instance of potential injury as a result of administrative controls not
being in place.
In the second incident of 02/03/06, Train 829-066, both the engineman and
Conductor sustained inhalation injuries while operating through the Macdonald tunnel. In
this incident the train entered the tunnel at thirteen miles an hour. Shortly thereafter due to
suspected overheated engines their speed decreased to four miles an hour at which time the
crew became engulfed in a cloud of exhaust. The crew described this cloud as being so dense
that they were unable to see the front of the engine and indeed could not see the blue lights
indicating the refuge bays where gas masks are stored. The crew also stated that at this time
they made the decision that they would be safest remaining in the cab of the locomotive rather
than stopping. In their eyes any unprotected exposure would be extremely unsafe. They had
been in contact with the RTC and were anticipating a speedy resumption of ventilation.
Meanwhile the cab of the locomotive itself was filling with exhaust to an alarming
degree. These conditions continued for an estimated fifteen minutes before the RTC was able
to restore ventilation and conditions began to normalize. To quote the conductor they
experienced “coughing, sweating, headache and stomach cramps thirteen to fifteen minutes
after smoke overtook us. When we came out of the tunnel were lightheaded and not thinking
straight.” Upon arrival at Albert Canyon they were met by D. Zatko and Jim Galloway who
transported them to hospital in Revelstoke, where they were administered oxygen and
undertook blood and urine tests. As of 02/03/14 neither employee has returned to work.
The Mount Macdonald tunnel subcommittee was formed in February, 2000 as a result of
a complete failure of the ventilation system and all backup systems.The events which led to the
formation of this sub committee were described in detail in a report submitted in the minutes
of The Workplace Committee meeting of June 2000. At this time the ventilation failures were
attributed to a lack of regular preventive maintenance. Subsequent to this report there have
been no incidents of consequence until the present time. The main thrust of the subcommittee
in the intervening time space has been to ensure that regular prescribed maintenance has
been ongoing.
With the occurrence of the two recent incidents it has become obvious to the committee
that predicting all the possible malfunctions of the ventilation system and backup systems is a
guessing game at best. What is not a guess is the serious potential repercussions of another
incident. We consider ourselves most fortunate that we are not preparing a report explaining a
more serious injury or, indeed, a fatality. It has become apparent to the committee that the
time has come for a complete evaluation of all previous recommendations as described in
several reports by the Occupational Hygiene Specialist. Specifically these are 1. Engineering
controls, 2. Administrative controls, 3.PPE.
At this time we feel it necessary to request and hope not necessary to demand, posthaste,
meetings with The Occupational Hygienist ,The BCISA Safety Advisor, all Workplace
Committee members and Management involved. The purpose of these meetings would include
a review of C.P.s Respiratory Protection Protection Policy and Program. We also feel it
necessary to study all procedures currently in place for RTE’s, ES and MOW employees.
There are in addition many questions related to emergency situations in tunnels which need to
be clarified . It is to be desired that these meetings can take place immediately as we feel this
situation warrants immediate attention. Thank you.
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